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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2402 
___________ 
 
DARRELL BELL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FAIRTON F.C.I. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-02464) 
District Judge:  Renee Marie Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 7, 2019 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 21, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Darrell Bell appeals from an order of the District Court denying his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm. 
Bell is a federal prisoner currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institute in 
Fairton, New Jersey (“FCI-Fairton”).  On June 8, 2010, Bell was arrested by local 
authorities in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on charges of aggravated assault, terroristic 
threats with intent to terrorize another, simple assault, recklessly endangering another 
person, and resisting arrest.  While in state custody, he was indicted in the United States 
District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on one count of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.  On June 16, 2011, Bell was sentenced in the Court of Common 
Pleas, Philadelphia County, to a 58 to 116-month term of imprisonment, with credit for 
time served while in pretrial custody from June 8, 2010 through June 16, 2011.  
Thereafter, on December 6, 2011, he was sentenced in federal court to a 37-month term 
of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his state-court sentence.   
On December 21, 2011, the United States Marshals Service returned Bell to 
Pennsylvania custody, and placed a detainer on him for his federal conviction.  The 
detainer was dated December 14, 2011, and marked as received by the Pennsylvania 
Prison System Records Department on December 20, 2011. 
Bell later received an additional state sentence for a probation revocation.  On July 
14, 2016, he finished serving his Pennsylvania sentences and, despite the federal detainer, 
was released by state authorities into the community. 
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On February 13, 2017, the District Court issued an arrest warrant for Bell to serve 
his federal sentence, and he was arrested the following day.  The Bureau of Prisons 
calculated his 37-month federal sentence as commencing on February 14, 2017. 
On February 21, 2018, Bell filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing 
that the Bureau of Prisons should have granted him credit for the seven months he was at 
liberty between his release from state confinement and his arrest by federal authorities.  
The Government answered the § 2241 petition, arguing that Bell was not entitled to a 
credit because he was not in custody during the time he was at liberty and federal 
authorities were not negligent.  The District Court agreed with the government and 
entered an order denying Bell’s § 2241 petition.   
Bell appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  Our Clerk advised 
the parties that we might act summarily to dispose of the appeal under Third Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We have developed the following test for addressing the type of 
claim Bell brings here: 
[I]n order for a prisoner to receive credit for time he was erroneously at 
liberty, the prisoner’s habeas petition must contain facts that demonstrate 
that he has been released despite having unserved time remaining on his 
sentence. Once he has done this, the burden shifts to the government to 
prove either (1) that there was no negligence on the part of the imprisoning 
sovereign, or (2) that the prisoner obtained or retained his liberty through 
his own efforts. 
 
                                              
1 A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal from the denial of a § 2241 
petition.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2007).   
We conclude that although Bell’s § 2241 petition contains facts demonstrating that 
he was released with unserved time remaining on his sentence, the Government has met 
its burden of showing there was no negligence on its part.  The federal authorities 
properly lodged a detainer on Bell, and the state authorities acknowledged receipt.  This 
case is therefore distinguishable from Vega, where the federal authorities never 
confirmed the state’s receipt of the detainer, and never followed up with the state 
regarding whether the state would comply.  See id. at 313.  By contrast, this case is very 
similar to Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2004), a case we relied upon in 
fashioning the Vega standard.  In Leggett, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of a petitioner’s claim for credit for the time he was 
erroneously at liberty between the completion of his state sentence and the start of his 
federal sentence because federal authorities lodged a detainer with the state authorities, 
and the state authorities acknowledged receipt of the same.  Id. at 233.  Here, as in 
Leggett, the erroneous time at liberty was not the result of negligence on the part of 
federal authorities.  Accordingly, Bell is not entitled to credit for the time he was at 
liberty.   
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Bell’s § 2241 petition.   
 
